4.2 KiB
Milestone 16 evidence: private systemd peer transport
Recorded 2026-10-27T22:42:48+02:00 on the native
x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu development host. This is implementation and
synthetic evidence, not systemd acceptance. The milestone remains blocked on
private-peer behavioral and disposable-VM checks.
Source and protocol basis
The existing adapter connected only with zbus::Connection::system(). That
cannot reach systemd where no system D-Bus daemon exists. Official systemd
source
shows root systemctl connecting to unix:path=/run/systemd/private and
checking peer credentials. Its manual
calls this an internal interface; compatibility across systemd releases is
not guaranteed. Pinned zbus 5.19.0
provides p2p and EXTERNAL-authentication support.
The adapter now selects the system bus first and falls back to the private
socket only for a missing/refused/disconnected bus endpoint during connection
setup, before any restart request. Permission, handshake and timeout failures
do not trigger fallback. The private path checks peer UID 0; method calls omit
the bus destination; its JobRemoved stream uses a local peer match without
org.freedesktop.DBus owner monitoring. The system-bus path retains its
destination and owner-change watch. Both preserve Subscribe before
RestartUnit, canonical unit identity, the shared deadline, job matching and
conservative submission uncertainty. No retry follows a possibly submitted
restart. Application backup/confirmation/runtime/applied logic is unchanged.
Checks, review, and gap
An independent GPT-6-Luna/high reviewer found M16-R1 (P2): private socket
permission errors were reduced to RequestFailed. A separate GPT-6-Luna/high
repairer changed the production builder error mapping to preserve
PermissionDenied and added a focused synthetic assertion. The reviewer
rechecked and closed R1. M16-R2 (P2) remains open: synthetic tests do not
execute the production private peer branch end to end. An attempted local zbus
UnixStream peer fixture failed at peer credential access with EPERM in the
sandbox; later fixture variants did not establish a successful protocol path.
Those experiments were removed from the test tree. They are not evidence that
real systemd rejects the implementation. No host private socket was accessed.
Pinned rustc/Cargo 1.97.1, rustfmt 1.9.0, and Clippy 0.1.97 were verified.
On the repaired inputs, from the repository root:
cargo test --locked --lib service::dbus::tests -- --test-threads=1: 16 passed.cargo fmt --all -- --check: exit 0.cargo clippy --locked --all-targets -- -D warnings: exit 0.cargo test --locked: 367 passed, 3 explicitly ignored, 0 failed, including 2 documentation tests. Selected Docker/VM suites were not run.cargo build --locked --release: exit 0.git diff --check: exit 0.
Base commit: fe7e3d61c22108acba5c4a86480254a12e089a53. Dirty inputs and
SHA256 at validation:
Cargo.toml:807d08cc43b4c3f986134b7aa5b051fd2f0966fab95ac01d861c65f173c77caaCargo.lock:6a929bb72d90da16b5ca7d209566e31a611d1ddcd5817ee778d7e9fe25b10c2esrc/service/dbus.rs:d1ed34dd8a46d2495299c776176d7d5f6cfa9b6abb29ec84b6045e74bdffeb26docs/DEPENDENCIES.md:1db85ecd3f892e3f42f1220eb7627cfd423406e46e5024bdf6599a647f07be1fdocs/TESTING.md:7ecab091999b50964b1641772a4cfc370639507b9c6621a058829a54b0f71325
Native release artifact target/release/wireguard-admin SHA256:
64c2851431ec406901e76dc866a05abd630a0e71adfd4efc16d3b44ea3c72b73.
The prior disposable Debian VM was stopped before guest installation and has
no verified guest marker or running systemd acceptance environment, per
VM_ACCEPTANCE.md. No private-socket or system-bus
restart was run in a disposable VM. Neither transport is accepted against real
systemd yet; production must not be used to fill this gap. The next check is
to finish and authorize a disposable VM with synthetic WireGuard configuration,
then run both transport paths and verify job completion plus full runtime
matching, with exact source/artifact identity.